We thank the TEG Program at CEPR, Stanford University, for its hospitality during the early stages of the preparation of this paper. We are grateful to Dan Black, Zvi Griliches, Shane Greenstein, Patrick Hiron, Adam Jaffe, Sam Kortum, Ralph Landau, Jim Markusen, Nathan Rosenberg, Manuel Trajtenberg, Bill Vogt and participants at the applied economics seminars at the University of Pittsburgh, CMU, NBER, Univesidad Carlos III, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, University of Leuven and University of Urbino for helpful comments. Zhang Jianyu provided competent research assistance. Fosfuri and Gambardella also thank the Italian Ministry of University and Scientific Research (MURST), and CNR (Committees 10 and 11) for financial support. Financial support from the European Union, DG XII, TSER Project N.SOE1-CT97-1059, is also gratefully acknowledged. The customary disclaimers apply. 
Introduction
That specialization and division of labor among firms promote economic welfare is almost an article of faith for economists. The legacy from Smith (1776) and Stigler (1951) is that when the optimal scale of production of an input is larger than the optimal size of the user firms, a specialized supplier can produce the input more efficiently because it can spread the fixed cost over a larger volume of output. Hence, division of labor is more extensive in larger markets. In turn, a more efficient production of the input induces the downstream industry to grow more rapidly (Young, 1929) .
But while the literature has typically focused on the vertical division of labor within an industry, this paper argues that an important and almost unexplored part of the story lies in the benefits that a division of labor in one market can generate for other markets. Specifically, we focus on how division of labor in one country has beneficial effects for other countries. We argue that these benefits are likely to be important when the upstream input requires a large fixed cost but is highly 'portable' and can be transported cheaply across space. Technology is such an input par excellence. Thus, if technology suppliers arise in one country first, then, once the technology is developed, these technology suppliers can sell it to other countries at a small incremental cost (especially if compared with the cost of developing the technology in the first place). In this way, follower countries benefit from investments in leading countries.
To examine this issue we study investment in chemical plants in less developed countries (henceforth LDCs) during the 1980s. The chemical industry provides an ideal test-bed for the question that we want to examine here. Beginning in the 1930s and continuing into the 1960s, the modern chemical industry in the developed countries (henceforth 'first world') grew rapidly . This stimulated the growth of firms that specialized in the design and engineering of the chemical processes, the so-called 'specialized engineering firms' (SEFs), which are analogous to the software engineering and computer consultancy firms that are more visible in the US economy today. SEFs have been important reservoirs of expertise in chemical plant technologies, which they provided in the form of engineering services to chemical firms. In some cases SEFs also developed radical process innovations but for the most part they sold improved versions of existing technologies packaged with engineering and design services. Other SEFs offered construction services in addition to engineering know-how. In the 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, as a modern chemical industry emerged in LDCs, it benefited from the presence of an upstream sector of technology suppliers in the first world. Simply put, the growth of the chemical industry in the first world created an upstream sector, which later spurred the growth of the chemical industry in the developing countries.
1
As a guide to our empirical results, we develop a simple model. The model assumes that a larger number of technology suppliers increases the net surplus that the buyers get from investing in a chemical plant. This is a natural assumption since buyers should benefit from being able to choose from a larger pool of suppliers, and this is consistent with a large set of economic explanations that variously emphasize search costs, reduced bargaining power of sellers, and a better 'match'. The main result of the model is that if the existing SEFs in the first world are also potential suppliers of chemical firms in LDCs, then a larger number of first world SEFs in a given market for chemical process technology implies greater investment in that market in the LDCs. From the point of view of the LDCs, the number of potential suppliers (first world SEFs) is determined by the extent of division of labor in the first world. Thus, the organization of the industry in the first world, or to be precise, the extent of division of labor in the first world, enhances the growth of the market (chemical industry) in the LDCs.
The model also predicts that the larger the number of first world SEFs, the greater the number of plants in LDCs whose engineering services are 'bought' from SEFs, and the smaller the number of plants whose engineering services are 'made' in-house by the chemical firms. Moreover, the impact of an increase in the supply of SEFs are more pronounced for companies that have higher cost of 'making' the technology in-house. This suggests that SEFs are more beneficial for local third world companies than for the multinational enterprises that locate in these markets.
We test these propositions using data on chemical plant investments in 139 leading chemical technologies and 38 LDCs. These are drawn from a comprehensive data set of more than 20000 chemical plants announced and constructed during the 1980s worldwide.
The next section provides the conceptual underpinnings of our approach and links it to the literature on technology and international trade. Section 3 presents our model. Section 4 discusses the empirical specification and presents our empirical results. Section 5 summarizes our findings and concludes the paper. The appendix describes our data set.
Division of labor, markets for technology, and international trade
This paper is related to several strands in the literature. Our emphasis on the lower cost of using technologies compared with the cost of developing them is similar in spirit to the literature on endogenous growth (e.g. Romer, 1990 and . Following Griliches (1979) and Jaffe (1986) , there is a well established literature on technology spillovers, and Coe and Helpman (1995) have provided evidence of international technological spillovers (see also Eaton and Kortum, 1996, and Keller, 1997) . This paper does not examine the effects of spillovers on total factor productivity, as many of the papers in this literature do, but on the flow of investments, because we do not have measures of the former at this disaggregate level. However, our paper moves beyond the simple observation that technological spillovers exist, and identifies a mechanism through which they take place -namely, the intermediation of an upstream sector which sells technology inputs through a full-fledged market for technology.
2 Note that both real and pecuniary effects may be involved. SEFs may imply lower technology transfer costs for LDCs. In addition, as already discussed, a larger number of SEFs results in LDC firms paying a lower price for technology and engineering services, a purely pecuniary effect. 3 Rich as our data are, we still cannot empirically distinguish between the two mechanisms because the net effect in both is to increase investment in LDCs. Thus, although our formalism focuses on the pecuniary externality, real externalities are likely to be involved as well.
The nature of the mechanism we study is similar to the one highlighted by the recent literature on 'general-purpose technologies', or GPTs (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1996) . GPTs have high fixed costs, but they can be applied repeatedly at low incremental cost. This leads to spillovers across industries in which the growth of one user sector benefits other user sectors through the intermediation of the GPT industry. Our paper shows that this argument can be extended to the transmission of growth across countries, and it provides empirical evidence of these mechanisms.
It is natural to ask at this point whether our story is not simply a story about international trade. It is, but with one difference. While the standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade model locates comparative advantage in natural resources or factor endowments, we locate it in the fact that chemical engineering services are based on cumulative learning and experience, and that the (fixed) costs of acquiring this expertise are already sunk when the LDC markets arise. Put differently, the first world has a comparative advantage in engineering services simply because first world 2 In other words, some of what appear to be "spillovers" may in fact be market mediated knowledge flows. In a recent paper, Zucker, Darby and Armstrong (1998) find that in biotechnology market mechanisms involving individual scientists may account for what appeared to be knowledge spillovers from universities to local firms.
engineering firms were founded more than 50 (and in some cases, more than a 100) years ago in response to the growth of the oil and chemical sectors in their own countries.
By stressing the historical sequence in the rise of new markets, our perspective also differs somewhat from Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) , who argue that international economic integration increases growth because, with integration, the fixed cost of producing 'ideas' can be spread over a larger market. In our model, integration is beneficial to the follower countries even though the number of SEFs in the first world does not increase when the first world and LDC markets are integrated. Although analytically convenient, our primary reason for assuming that SEFs do not increase in response to LDC growth is that it is more faithful to history. As a historical fact, most SEFs arose to serve the first world market and their investments were not motivated by the hope of serving LDC markets that did not as yet exist.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the product life cycle (e.g. Vernon, 1979), whereby as technologies or products mature, they are transferred from the first world to LDCs.
This literature has focused on one mechanism through which this transfer occurs -multinational enterprises (MNE) operating in final product markets. This has often been justified by the assumption that while downstream products are tradable, upstream inputs are not (e.g., Nadiri, 1993 , Rodriguez-Clare, 1996 First, the growth of the first world market for a given chemical process encourages the rise of engineering firms specialized in the design of chemical plants for that process. This result, which we do not formally prove here, is completely intuitive. It only requires that entry as an SEF have a fixed cost (corresponding to the cost of acquiring technical expertise), and that the price-cost margins (profits per unit of output) that SEFs earn, decline with the number of SEFs in that sector.
The second effect is from the SEFs in the first world to the size of the LDC market. To understand this effect suppose that first world SEFs could supply LDCs. Then, apart from relying on multinationals, either LDC firms would have to provide the services themselves or rely on domestic SEFs that may exist. In either case, LDC firms would face very high costs. Having fewer SEFs to choose from increases search costs, lowers the bargaining power of the buyer, reduces the likelihood of getting a more advanced or appropriate technology. As a result, the expected surplus of setting up a plant would be lower, and this implies fewer investments in chemical plants. Given the high transportation costs for many chemical products, this would imply slower growth of chemicals, and industrial activity more generally in LDCS.
This simple story relies strongly on the assumption that the critical input is easily 'tradable' across countries. It is then important to understand why is this input tradable. Even though an ammonia plant in the US is a different object from an ammonia plant in India, what remains unchanged are the basic principles of how an ammonia plant should be designed and engineered.
Clearly, applying what one has learnt in one place in another is not always easy, and the literature has shown that technology transfer is not costless (e.g. Teece, 1988) . The important point, however, is that the transfer cost be substantially smaller than the cost of developing the technology, an assumption that fits especially well in the context of engineering services. It is in this sense that the fixed cost of developing or inventing the technology is paid by the industries or countries that emerge earlier, while the industries or countries that come later pay only the marginal cost.
This also points to the importance of independent suppliers that do not produce the downstream product.
4 Downstream producers (chemical firms) are less likely to sell technology or other key inputs to other producers. Unlike upstream specialists (SEFs), they have to offset the gains from selling technology against the loss in actual or potential revenues from selling the downstream product. Thus, in addition to the classical gains from productivity improvements, specialization and division of labor can have other benefits for industrial growth sometimes overlooked.
The model
We develop a simple stylized model to motivate our empirical analysis which focuses on the investment decision of chemical firms in LDCs. We posit that the first world market for chemical process technology has already emerged and a division of labor achieved. In other words, we take as given the number of SEFs, k, which have entered the market for engineering services in the first world. 5 We assume that first world SEFs can costlessly supply LDCs, with technology-specific costs already sunk. 6 Therefore, the number of SEFs which can potentially serve a LDC market is equal to k. Note that k is independent of the LDC market size. 7 We also assume that SEFs are exante symmetric.
Let us now turn to the LDC market. We do not explicitly model downstream competition Let π n be the net surplus to a given buyer (chemical firm) from a plant supplied by the n th SEF. We assume that π n is ex-post idiosyncratic to the buyer-seller match. Therefore, π n is an i i
is the probability that the net surplus from running a plant bought from the upstream sector is less or equal than t. Finally, for any chemical firm let a be the net surplus from an in-house technology and let a be distributed according to the cumulative function F (.) .
We now analyze the investment decision of chemical firms in LDCs. By using the notation introduced so far, if
{ }
Max z a , ≥ 0 , the firm will invest in the plant. Moreover, if z ≥ a the firm will buy the engineering services; and if z < a it will supply them in-house. We show first that the greater the number of SEFs, the greater is the number of plants that are constructed. The expected number of plants, E(size), in a given LDC market is:
where ( )
Result 1: The total investment in a given LDC market, E(size), is greater the greater is the number of (potential) technology suppliers, k.
Proof. By taking first differences with respect to k in expression (2) we get:
which suffices to show Result 1.n It is also easy to see from (3) that E(size) is concave in k, so that the marginal increase in investment diminishes with k. We next show that SEFs increase the probability of 'buy' and decrease the probability of 'make'. One can write the expected number of plants that are bought from the upstream technological sector, E(buy), and the expected number of plants that are made in house by the chemical firms, E(make):
Now, by writing
we can state our second result:
Then, by taking first differences in expression (4) with respect to k one obtains:
which completes the proof.n Our final result is useful because it develops an implication of the theory that is not obvious and so provides an additional test for the theory itself. Consider any variable x which increases the net surplus from running an in-house engineered plant (i.e. increases the profitability of the 'make' strategy). Formally, we assume that x x We constructed the following variables. SIZE ij is the total investment in millions of US dollars in our 139 processes i and 38 countries j. This is obtained by multiplying the number of plants in ij by the average investment cost of a plant in process i in all LDCs. 8 Similarly, we construct BUY ij and MAKE ij , which are the total dollar investments in plants whose engineering services are bought from an unaffiliated contractor, and the total investment in plants whose engineering services are made in-house (or by an affiliated SEF). DOM ij and MNE ij are the total dollar investments by LDC and multinational firms respectively. 9 SIZE_FW i is the total value of investment in process i in the first world. This is obtained by multiplying the total number of plants in process i in the first world by COST_FW i , the average investment cost of a plant in process i in the first world. SEF_FW i is the number of firms (SEFs) that provide engineering services in process i in the first world.
We constructed two other process-specific variables, NOVEL i and PROCPAT i . As country-specific characteristics we used measures of the economic size of the country (log(GDP j ), log(POP j ), log(ENERGY j ), log(AREA j )), and other variables --human capital (HKAP j ), openness to imports of intermediate goods (OPEN j ), geographic area dummies. We also used dummy variables for the presence in the country of oil or gas reserves and interacted them with the sector dummies for oil refining plants and gas plants (DOIL ij and DGAS ij ). We also interacted log(AREA j ) with a dummy for the three sectors inorganic chemicals, agricultural chemicals, and minerals & metallurgy (ICHEM i + AGRI i + MM i ). This is because larger countries are more likely to possess natural resources which are the basis for production in inorganic chemicals and minerals. Similarly, it is more likely that bigger countries have large areas for extensive agricultural production. Apart from log(SEF_FW i ), we used the following processspecific characteristics as controls: sector dummies, log(SIZE_FW i ), log(COST_FW i ), log(PROCPAT i ), and NOVEL i .
11 Table 3 presents the results of our OLS estimations of equation (9) for SIZE ij , BUY ij , and MAKE ij . The key parameters are the elasticities of the three dependent variables with respect to SEF_FW i . The estimated elasticities of SIZE ij and BUY ij are respectively 0.46 and 0.52, and they are statistically significant. By contrast, the elasticity of MAKE ij is very small, and insignificantly different from zero. The marginal effects of SEF_FW i , computed across all observations in our sample, are $3.97 millions for SIZE, $ 4.32 millions for BUY, and a mere $6,600 dollars for MAKE. As predicted by Result 2 in our model, the marginal effect of SEFs is greater for the 'buys' than for the chemical plant investments as a whole, and the effect on the 'makes' is almost zero.
Thus, the important result of table 3 is that the effects of SEF_FW on SIZE and BUY are of sizable magnitude and they are statistically significant in spite of our extensive controls for the size of the chemical process and country markets. In this respect, note also that our measures of market size (e.g., GDP, ENERGY, AREA, SIZE_FW) are generally significant in all three equations.
Finally, in all three equations, the cost of a 'typical' plant (COST_FW i ), and our measures of technological change and complexity (NOVEL i and PROCPAT i ) have the expected sign. As predicted by the product lifecycle theory, more costly and technological advanced or complex processes are associated with lower LDC investments.
Measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity: Instrumental variable estimation of SIZE ij
Our empirical procedure in the previous section raises two important issues. First, our measure of potential suppliers, SEF_FW i ignores the possibility that an SEF operating in a certain market could be a potential supplier for a related process. Our assumption is certainly plausible.
For instance, our data base shows that three different sets of SEFs supply the markets for three different types of polyethylene-high-density, low-density, and linear low density polyethylene- European subsidiaries of US SEFs. In short, there seems to be insufficient cross country variation in the effective supply of SEFs for this to be a useful way to identify their impact.
By contrast, differences across processes in the nature of the technology has been an important source of variations in the number of SEFs. 13 We have two instruments that exploit this Landau, and Rosenberg, 1998 .) Thus, the top oil companies would have a sort of ambiguous effect -on the one hand, they are large enough 12 We also estimated a lower bound for the estimated elasticity based on the assumption that the unmeasured demand variation had a constant elasticity for different types of investors (LDC firms versus multinationals). Our estimates, available on request, indicate a lower bound to the elasticity of 0.38 of SIZE with respect to SEF_FW, which is very close to the OLS and GMM estimates reported here in table 5.
to produce in-house, but on the other hand they have been more active in outsourcing these services.
The second instrument -i.e. the share of first world greenfield plants in process i vis-a-vis expansion or revamping of existing plants -has a similar justification. Greenfield plants are likely to be more complex projects than mere expansions or revamping of existing capacities. As a result, they are more likely to require the work of specialist contractors. In sume, we have two instruments that are should be uncorrelated with unmeasured variations in market size but are likely to affect the demand for SEF services in the first world. Table 4 shows that SEF_FW i s negatively correlated with SLARGECO i , and positively correlated with and SGREEN i . 14 As a check against the possibility that, since large firms are more likely to move abroad, SLARGECO i may have a direct impact on investments in LDCs we also estimate a specification where we control for the share of plants by multinational enterprises in process i in the first world. 15 The effect of this additional variable was small and insignificant, and it did not affect our estimates of the impact of SEF_FW i . Hausman, 1978 , for details). Table 5 shows that the potential endogeneity bias of SEF_FW i is quite modest. Our GMM estimator of the elasticity with respect to SEF_FW i is 0.44, which is very close to our original OLS 13 For instance, some processes are based more than others on standard and codified technologies, which encourages specialization and increases the number of SEFs. 14 In other specifications, we also used the share of the top 200 oil firms in first world plants as a separate instrument, with little change in the results. We also tried using the share of first world plants by the chemical (and/or oil) companies among the top 50 and top 100 companies in terms of first world plants. Our results are robust to such variations. 15 Results available on request. Multinational enterprises were defined to be all the companies operating in six or more countries in the first world.
estimate of 0.46. Moreover, based on the Hausman test, one cannot reject the nul hypothesis that the potential endogeneity of SEF_FW i had no effect on the OLS estimate of this elasticity. The computed chi-square statistics is 0.02, which is far smaller than the theoretical chi-square values of 3.84 and 6.64 at the 5% and 1% confidence levels and one degree of freedom.
Assessing the 'marginal' effect of SEFs
To get a sense of the order of magnitude of the impact of an upstream sector of technology suppliers on the total investment of the downstream market, we use our GMM estimate to compute the effect of one additional SEF in a typical process market on the expected total dollar value of investment in the LDCs in that process market. As figure 2 shows, the sample average of the effect of one extra SEF across all our processes and countries is $3.75 millions over 1981-90, with the increase being larger for larger countries like China and India, and smaller in smaller countries. For the 38 LDCs as a whole, the increase in investment in a typical process would then be $142.5 millions, or 4.75% of the average investment per process of about $3 billion in these 38 countries over the ten year period. The average investment cost of a plant in LDCs is about $121 million.
Thus, our results imply that for a typical process, one additional SEF will result in slightly more than one extra plant over a ten year period for the 38 LDCs taken as a group. The impact of an additional SEF is statistically significant, but small.
[FIGURES 2, 3, AND 4 ABOUT HERE]
Recall however, that this effect is the average effect over the sample: It varies varies by the size and nature of the process. For instance, figure 3 shows that the effect diminishes with size.
Processes where there is a large number of third world plants are likely to be less affected than others. There are two forces at work here. On the one hand, a given percentage increase in 16 A non-linear GMM procedure, suggested by Mullahy (1997) , of the form SIZE ij = Y a u + e, where Y is our vector of regressors, a is the set of parameters to be estimated, and u and e are stochastic error termss, produced an implausibly high estimate of the elasticity. investment implies a larger dollar increase if the base level investment is high. On the other hand, an additional SEF in the market is more important when the number of SEFs is small than when the number is large. Our results suggests that the "diminishing returns to the number of SEFs" effect dominates when there is a large number of plants. The variation in SIZE ij due to an extra SEF for the typical process with total investment in the 38 countries equal to our average of $3 billions is 0.44*3/k where k is the number of existing first world SEFs in that process. Thus, if there were only one SEF in that process, the increase in investment due to an additional SEF would be of about $1.3 billions, which corresponds to more than 10 extra plants on average in the 38 countries over the ten year period. For k = 12 (i.e. the mean of SEF_FW i in the sample, from table 1), the increase would be of $109 millions, i.e. less than one extra plant over the 10 year period in the 38 countries.
Thus, the results indicate that division of labour is important, but that in many sectors it has proceed far enough that further entry of specialised suppliers would have only a smaller impact.
Finally, given that technological maturity increases both the expected number of plants, and the average investment per plant, our estimates imply that the impact of an additional SEF is likely to be greater in more mature processes. This is borne out by figure 4. The figure shows that processes where the technological frontier is moving rapidly are likely to be affected less than more mature processes.
The differential effect of SEFs on domestic and multinational firms
Another interesting issue is whether SEFs have different impacts on different types of investors. Specifically, we ask whether SEFs are more likely to benefit domestic LDC firms rather than first world multinational enterprises. Result 3 in our model predicts a chemical company better able to perform in-house engineering should be less affected by the presence of SEFs compared with a company with lower in-house engineering capabilities. It is natural to think that first world chemical multinationals (MNE)have better in-house capabilities for process engineering than local LDC companies, and thus the impact of SEFs be greater for LDC firms than for MNEs.
We estimated two equations for the total dollar investment by domestic firms and multinationals-DOM ij and MNE ij -using the same specification and variables employed earlier. SEFs are a sources of increased competition for the very same first world companies that operate into the LDC markets, and that gave rise to these SEFs in earlier periods. Finally, to measure the effects of SEFs on LDC firms and multinationals, note from table 1 that the sample average of the total dollar investment by domestic firms in ij is $62.8 millions, which implies $2.4 billions for the 38 countries as a whole, over the ten year period. Thus, using the GMM estimate of the elasticity of DOM ij , the additional dollar investment by LDC firms due to an extra SEF for a typical process with k SEFs is 0.46*2.4/k. For k = 1, the additional investment would be of about $1 billion over 1981-90, or about 9 extra plants. For the average number of SEFs in our data, i.e. k = 12, the marginal effect on one extra SEF would be of $92 millions, i.e., about three fourths of an average plant.
Similar calculations for MNE indicate that, using our GMM estimate, the effect of an extra SEF on the average process is -0.25*578/k where $578 millions is the average across processes of the total dollar investment in the 38 countries by MNE. For k = 1, this expression is equal to $145 millions-that is if there were only one SEF, an extra SEF would reduce the investments by MNE in our 38 countries by slightly more than one plant. For k = 12, the reduced investment by MNE would be of only $12 millions.
Conclusions
Technological spillovers play an important role in the process of economic growth. (See Griliches, 1979 , Jaffe, 1986 , or Coe and Helpman, 1995 But the typical description of the mechanism of these spillovers is, in Alfred Marshall's often used phrase, one where "the secrets ... are in the air". Important as this ethereal mechanism may be, there are other mechanisms through which technology and knowledge are transferred across sectors and countries that are more material and more amenable to economic analysis. In this paper, we argued that an important institutional form through which these apparent spillovers take place is division of labor. In addition to improving productivity through specialization, a division of labor can also serve as a mechanism whereby technology is made available to latecomers at low costs.
The economics of this mechanism is very simple. As Romer (1990) has emphasized, the development of technological capability is a fixed cost activity, while the productive application of the technological capability is a (low) marginal cost activity. In our story, firms in the upstream sector invest in learning about the production process. If the upstream sector is competitive these costs are ultimately paid by customers downstream. The expertise and the technologies that they supply are process-and not location-specific, and thus, can be made available to downstream firms in other countries. Competition between these firms implies that the benefits of the acquired expertise will be made available to users in other countries, or in other sectors of the economy, at prices close to marginal cost because the development costs have already been sunk. However, as our results also show, the benefits for the downstream industry of an upstream sector of technology suppliers diminish as the number of upstream suppliers increases. As also noted by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) in a different context, the advantages to consumers of an extra supplier decrease sharply as the number of suppliers rises.
In short, what our results imply is not that the observed rates of investment in chemical plants in LDCs are being fueled solely by SEFs and could never be achieved without SEFs. Rather, they imply that the investment is taking place earlier and more rapidly than if LDCs had to rely solely upon chemical producers in the first world to transfer the technology, or even worse, if they had to 're-invent the wheel' -i.e., develop process technologies and the broader engineering expertise required to design and construct chemical plants domestically. In short, the organization of industry in the first world 'matters' not just for the growth of the first world but also for the growth of the LDCs. not want to disclose the name, or the information is simply missing. However, we also used information about these plants from another data base (Hydrocarbon Processing Unit -HPI, compiled by Gulf Publishing, Texas) to see whether we could classify the blanks as 'buys' or 'makes'. The details of this diagnostic check are available from the authors upon request. The check was inconclusive because a large number of the identified plants in the other data base were still blanks. However, since most of the identified plants which did report the name of an engineering company in the other data base were 'buys', our check ruled out the possibility that the blanks are predominately 'makes'. We performed all our empirical analyses under different assumptions about the blanks -i. e. all the blanks are 'buys', all the blanks are 'makes', the blanks are 50% 'buys' and 50% 'makes', the blanks are distributed between 'buys' and 'makes' in the same proportion as in the case in which the name of the engineering company (or 'staff') is observed. The results presented here are those where we assume that all the blanks are 'buys'. It turns out that all other assumptions about the blanks had even more favorable results for our theory.
Construction of PROCPAT i . PROCPAT i was constructed as follows. We selected all relevant patents using a keyword search with the process as the keyword. From these, we selected and read the full abstracts of patents that exactly fit our criterion. The patent classes (and sub-classes) into which these patents were classified were examined to ensure that the invention was in fact a process invention. These subclasses of the US patent classification system were used along with the process name as the basis for Boolean queries of the US patent database to generate the final set of patents, one set for each process. (The details of the Boolean queries are available upon request.) The titles (and some abstracts selected at random) of the patents in the final sample for each process were examined to ensure that the final sample did not contain irrelevant patents.
Countries. In all our analyses, and for all the variables that we constructed, we defined first world to be all the OECD countries except Mexico, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, South Korea and Turkey. These countries joined the OECD only very recently and for our purposes, it was more appropriate to include them in the LDC category. Therefore our first world countries are all the Western European countries, the USA and Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The 38 countries in our sample are: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. This appendix provides a way of assessing the question of unobserved variation in market size that does not rely on the use of instruments (the method followed in the paper.) Consider investments by domestic LDC firms and MNEs. Let where Y 1 = Domestic plants, Y 2 = MNE plants, X = matrix of explanatory variables, (Z+ζ) = potential market size with Z = measured component of potential market size, ζ = unobserved component of potential market size. All relevant variables are measured in logs so that the coefficients are to be interpreted as elasticities. As usual, we assume that ε 1 and ε 2 are i.i.d. random errors. Moreover, since the unobserved component of market size varies across processes but not countries, it is natural to specify the equations at the level of the process. Accordingly, in this Appendix we show OLS estimates obtained after aggregating across countries, so that the unit of observation is the process, not the process-country pair.
Letting {b i , a i } represent the OLS estimate of {β i , α i }, and E{} representing the expectation operator, we can write the normal equations as (e.g., see Johnston, 1984, pp 111- 
DOM KFW
= 0.48, as computed above, and by evaluating the elasticity at the average value θ 1 = 0.78, a lower bound of β, the elasticity of SIZE with respect to SEF_FW i , is 0.36. If α 1 ≠ α 2 , then, the lower bound. However, it is easy to see that even for large values of the difference between α 1 and α 2 , the true coefficient is bounded away from zero. 
II.2 GMM ESTIMATES: SIZE ij , CONTROLLING FOR SHARE OF MNE INVESTMENT IN THE FIRST WORLD

